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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In a social dilem m a the provision of a public good requires som e costly ef-
fo rt fro m o n e o r m o re in d iv id u a ls, b u t ex p licit co n tra ctin g is n o t p o ssib le.
Ea c hp a r t i c i p a n ti nad i l e mmat h e r e f o r eh a sa ni n c e n t i v et of r e e - r i d eo nt h e
contributions of the others. H ow socialinstitutions m itigate socialdilem m as
is the subject ofa large literature both in econom ics and the socialsciences
m ore generally. In this paper, w e instead study the evolutionary survival
properties of an intrinsic m otivation to contribute in dilem m a situations.
C onsider the case ofcooperation w ithin the ¯rm . W hen individualcontri-
buti onsto outputarenotveri ¯abl y m easurabl e,com pl etecontracti ng wi thi n
the ¯rm is im possible, and a free-rider problem is present. T his observation
has been used as the basi s for expl anati ons of the organi zati onalstructure
of the ¯rm , such as the m onitoring and budget-balance-breaking roles of
an outside ow ner discussed by A lchian and D em setz [1] and H olm strÄ om [ 7] ,
respectively.
B ut free-rider problem s in production m ay also be overcom e if individ-
ual agents have an internalized w ork ethic. E xperim ental evidence of long
standing suggests that
1. peopl e do in fa ct co n trib u te in d ilem m a situ a tio n s ev en th o u g h co n tri-
bution is not enforceable,and
2. the rate of contri buti on i s decl i ni ng i n group si ze and the i ndi vi dual
cost of contributing.
(See, e.g., the classic study of Latan¶ e, W illia m s, a n d H a rk in s [1 0 ]. F o r a
survey speci¯cally ofthe experim ents on the underlying m odelofthe present
3paper, see C roson and M arks [6].) In a broad sense, laboratory behav-
ior therefore m ore or less conform s to som e of the possible predictions of
the noncooperati ve publ i c goodsprovi si on m odeli ntroduced by Pal f rey and
Rosenthal[ 13,14] ,whi ch we shal ltake asourbasi c m odeli n thi spaper.
A versi on of thi s m odelwas ori gi nal l y proposed to expl ai n phenom ena
such as posi ti ve turnout i n el ecti ons. G i ven that other peopl e vote, the
p ro b a b ility o f b ein g p iv o ta l is sm a ll. If v o tin g is co stly to th e in d iv id u a l
voter, how can it be rational to vote? T he earlier political science literature
puzzled over this. It w as often suggested that observed voting behavior could
only be explained by there being utility directly attached to the act ofvoting.
T hi s noti on i s probl em ati c for at l east two reasons. Fi rst,i t cannot be
ra tio n a l fo r ev ery o n e to a b sta in , eith er, sin ce th en th e p ro b a b ility o f b ein g
deci si ve i s one for an i ndi vi dualw ho does deci de to vote. H ence there m ust
b e so m e p o sitiv e tu rn o u t in eq u ilib riu m . T h is is th e p o in t m a d e b y P a lfrey
a n d R o sen th a l. B u t seco n d ly, ev en if in d iv id u a ls a re in trin sica lly m o tiva ted
to vote, or, m ore generally, to contribute tow ard the provision of a public
g o o d , h ow co u ld su ch a b eh av io ra l tra it su rv iv e in th e lo n g ru n if it is co stly
to its carrier?
Since in any given dilem m a interaction a contributor is alw ays strictly
w orse o® than a non-contributor, the intrinsic m otivation to contribute|
w hat we shal lthi nk ofas a wor ke t hi c | coul d not evol ve unl ess there were
ma n yi n t e r a c t i o n sg o i n go na tt h es a met i me ,a n db e h a v i o r a lma t e r i a lf r o m
one i nteracti on m i ght end up i n another l ater on. Ifthe l atter i s the case,
then the direct ¯tness disadvantage of contributors m ay be balanced by the
indirect cost to noncontributors arising from the risk of being m atched into
an interaction w here there are too few contributors and w here the public
good i s therefore not provi ded. W hen thi s happens, we are deal i ng w i th
g ro u p selectio n in th e sen se o f, e.g ., S o b er a n d W ilso n [1 9 ].
T h e g en era l P a lfrey -R o sen th a l m o d el ty p ica lly h a s m u ltip le eq u ilib ria ,
som e of w hich involve positive contributions, others w hich do not. In this
paper we em bed the gam e i n a dynam i c evol uti onary setti ng wi th random
4m utati ons (al ong the l i nes ofYoung and Foster [ 23]and K andori ,M ai l ath,
a n d R o b [8 ]), w h ich a llow s u s to p red ict th e eq u ilib ria w e w o u ld b e lik ely
to observe i n the l ong run. By evol uti on we shal lm ean cul turalevol uti on
by m eans ofi m i tati on ofsuccessfulbehavi or,but our m odeli s al so open to
otheri nterpretati ons.W eshow thatf orgroup si zessm al lenough,and a cost
ofcontri buti ng l ow enough,i n the l ong run we are m ostl i kel y to observe a
positive am ount of contributions even w hen also non-contribution is a stable
state of the determ inistic m odel.
Thepa pe ri so r g a ni z e da sf o l l o ws .W ei n t r o duc et heunde r l y i ngmo de lb y
m eans of a sim ple exam ple,and note the relation to group selection theories,
i n Secti on 2. Secti on 3 studi es the determ i ni sti c evol uti onary dynam i cs of
the m ore general m odel. W e note that there are generally evolutionarily
stabl e equi l i bri a i nvol vi ng no contri buti on. Secti on 4 gi ves exam pl es of al l
the possible dynam ic behaviors of the determ inistic m odel. In Section 5
w e in tro d u ce m u ta tio n s, a n d g iv e co n d itio n s fo r eq u ilib ria w ith a p o sitiv e
m easure of contributors to be selected in the long run. Section 6 concludes.
A ll proofs of propositions are in the A ppendix.
2 G roup Sel ecti on and the W ork Ethi c
W hen contributors survive evolutionary selection in socialdilem m a interac-
ti ons,as we shal lshow m ay happen,i t i s an exam pl e ofgroup sel ection at
w ork. G roup selection is naturalselection w here w hat m atters is the di®eren-
ti al¯tnessesofgroups,notdi ®erencesi n ¯tnessbetween i ndi vi dual swi thi n
the sam e group. O f special interest are situations in w hich a trait that is
di sadvantaged vis-µ a-vi s other traits w ithin a group can nevertheless grow in
relative population representation over tim e.
Al ready Charl esD arwi n noted thatthesurvi valoftrai tsseem i ngl y di sad-
vantageousto the i ndi vi dualorgani sm m i ghtbe expl ai ned by thei rbene¯ts
f orthe group.The centralprobl em thatgroup sel ecti on theori eshave f aced
5In d ivid u al 2
Wo r k e r S h i r k e r
In d ivid u al 1 Wo r k e r 1 ¡ k;1 ¡ k 1 ¡ k;1
Shi rker 1;1 ¡ k 0;0
Tabl e 1: A n exam pl e group i nteracti on.
si nce then i s to de¯ne preci sel y what consti tutes a group. O nl y f ai rl y re-
cen tly, th a n k s to th e w o rk o f, e.g ., S o b er a n d W ilso n [1 9 ], h a s so m e cla rity
b e e nr e a c h e do nt h i si s s u e .
A lthough group selection e®ectshave recently attracted som e attention in
econom i cs(see,e. g. ,SjÄ ostrÄ om and W ei tzm an [ 18] ,B ergstrom [ 5] ,R obson [ 15] ,
and K uzm ics [9]),it is seldom pointed out that the potentialfor such e®ects
i s al ready bui l t i nto the standard evol uti onary gam e theory m odel .
C onsider the follow ing exam ple,a specialcase ofthe m ore generalm odel
(due to P alfrey and R osenthal [13]) that w e shall study in this paper. A
group consi stsoftwo i ndi vi dual s. A n i ndi vi duali sprogram m ed1 to be either
a wor ke rora shirker.Iftherei satl eastoneworkeri n thegroup,thegroup i s
successf ul ,and each i ndi vi dualgetsa grosspayo®,or¯t ness,of1.O therwi se
each i ndi vi dualgets a payo® ofzero. A worker al so al ways sustai ns the cost
k,wi t h 0<k <1. T hat i s,the payo® structure ofthe group i nteracti on i s
as show n i n Tabl e 1.
N ote that if there is one w orker and one shirker in the group, the ¯tness
o ft h ewo r k e ri ss t r i c t l yl e s st h a nt h a to ft h es h i r k e r .He n c ewema ys a y
that w orkers are strictly disadvantaged relative to shirkers in a group. (T his
does not m ean that being a w orker is a strictly dom inated strategy.) B ut if
the group consists of tw o shirkers, they w ill both do less w ell than does a
1A related paper, Lohmann, Oechssler, and WÄ arneryd [11], studies the survival proper-
ties of altruistic preferences in a social dilemma where individuals behave rationally given
their preferences and their information about the interaction situation.
6w orker in a group w ith a shirker. A group w ith tw o shirkers is not successful.
That i s,al though a worker al ways has l ower ¯tness than a shi rker in th e
sam e group,i n a group w i th at l east one worker everyone has greater ¯tness
than i ndi vi dual si n a group w i th onl y shi rkers.H ence workersi ncrease group
¯tnessatthe expense ofthei rown i ndi vi dual¯tness.
Suppose now that there are m any groups,com posed random l y out ofa
large population w here the overallshare of w orkers is x 2 [0 ;1] . T he average
¯t nes sofwor ker si st hen1¡ k,and thatofshi rkersi sx¢1+ (1¡ x)¢0= x. H ence
if w e h av e x< 1 ¡ k,workers have greater average ¯tness than shi rkers and
wo u l dt e n dt og r o wi nr e l a t i v er e p r e s e n t a t i o ni nt h ep o p u l a t i o n .Co n v e r s e l y ,
if a t a n y tim e w e h av e x> 1 ¡ k,the population proportion ofshirkers w ould
increase. H ence x =1 ¡ k is the only stable proportion of w orkers. A lthough
w orkers su®er the cost k, s h i r k e r sr u nt h er i s ko f e n d i n gu pi nag r o u pt h a t
i snotsuccessf ul .
S o b er a n d W ilso n [1 9 ] id en tify tw o p ro p erties n ecessa ry fo r g ro u p selectio n
ofl ocal l y di sadvantaged trai tsto occur| thatgroup i nteracti onsare i sol ated
f rom each other i n payo® term s,i . e. ,that what happens i n one group does
not a®ect what happens i n another,and that there i s m i xi ng ofbehavi oral
m ateri alover ti m e,so that the o®spri ng ofpl ayers i n one group m ay end up
i n another,di ®erentl y com posed,group. Thi s al so hi ghl i ghts the f act that
evolutionary gam e theory in general (see, e.g., M ailath [12] for a survey) is,
i n essence,about group sel ecti on. T he standard evol uti onary gam e theory
m odelconcernsi ndi vi dualagentsf rom a l argepopul ati on random l y m atched
a n d re-m a tch ed to p lay g a m es (ty p ica lly, tw o -p lay er g a m es). T h e m a tch is,
ofcourse,a group.
Aswehaveseen,thel arge- popul ati on versi on ofourexam pl egam ehasa
u n iq u e sta b le ev o lu tio n a ry eq u ilib riu m w ith a p o sitiv e freq u en cy o f w o rk ers.
In the fol l ow i ng we shal l show , however, that i n a m ore general setti ng,
w ith m ore than tw o players in a group and a contribution threshold greater
th a n o n e, th ere is a lw ay s a sta b le eq u ilib riu m w ith n o w o rk ers a s w ell. W e
shal leventual l y gi ve condi ti onsforan equi l i bri um w i th posi ti ve contri buti on
7levels to be selected in the long run w hen the system is sub jected to random
m utations.
3 D eterm i ni sti c E vol uti on
W enow general i zetheexam pl ef rom theprecedi ng secti on.W eassum ethere
i s a l arge num ber N ofi ndi vi dual s,each ofwhom i s ei ther a w orker or a
shirker. T he share of w orkers in the population is x 2 [0 ;1] .
Individuals are random ly m atched 2 in to ¯rm s that have n ¸ 2me mb e r s
each. E ach ¯rm 's technology is such that in case there are at least m wor ke r s
i n the¯rm ,the¯rm i ssuccessf uland each ¯rm m em bergetsa grosspayo® or
¯tness of 1. W e assum e 1 · m · n . A s before,w orkers also alw ays sustain
the ¯tness cost k,wi t h 0<k <1.
L etting ¹ be the random num ber ofother workers i n a m atchi ng,the
expected ¯tnessofa workeri stheref ore
u w (x): = Pr ob( ¹ ¸ m ¡ 1)¢1+ Pr o b( ¹<m ¡ 1)¢0 ¡ k;
and that ofa shi rker
u s(x): = Pr ob( ¹ ¸ m ) ¢1+ Pr o b( ¹<m) ¢0:
Hence the average expected ¯tnessi n the popul ati on i s
¹ u(x): = xuw +( 1 ¡ x)u s = x(P rob(¹ ¸ m ¡ 1)¡ k)+ ( 1¡ x)P rob(¹ ¸ m );
and the di®erence betw een the expected ¯tness of a w orker and the popula-
tion average is
u w (x) ¡ ¹ u(x)= ( 1¡ x)(P rob(¹ = m ¡ 1)¡ k):
2In the following, we shall ignore complications arising from the fact that the population
is actually ¯nite, i.e., we shall assume the law of large numbers applies.
8Si nce ¹ i sbi nom i al l y di stri buted we have that






m ¡1 (1 ¡ x)
n ¡m :
N ow assum e actions are taken at discrete tim es t 2f 1=N ;2=N ;:::g.I n
every peri od exactl y one i ndi vi dual ,draw n at random ,has the opportuni ty
to revise his strategy.
W e shal lassum e the strategy updati ng proceeds by m eans ofi m i tati on.
T he individualw ho gets the opportunity to revise observes the action choice
and current expected payo® of a random ly draw n other individual, and m ay
choose to i m i tate the behavi orofthe observed i ndi vi dual .
It seem s rea so n a b le to a ssu m e th a t th e p ro b a b ility o f im ita tio n is in crea s-
i ng i n the currentpayo® advantage ofthe sam pl ed acti on. In a non-strategi c
setti ng,Schl ag [ 16,17]show s that thi s i s i n fact the optim alschem e for im -
i tati on. Apestegui a,Huck,and O echssl er [ 2]provi de experi m entalresul ts
that suggest thi s m odelal so agrees wel lw i th actualbehavi or.
W e sh a ll h ere a ssu m e th e p ro b a b ility o f im ita tio n is in fa ct ex a ctly eq u a l
to the approxim ate expected payo® di®erence betw een the strategy of the
random l y drawn other pl ayer and that ofthe revi si ng i ndi vi dual ,provi ded
th is d i® eren ce is p o sitiv e. T h is b eh av io r d e¯ n es a M a rk ov ch a in X N on the
space ¢ N X = f0;1=N ;2=N ;:::;1g w ith the transition probabilities
P (x;x +1 =N )= x (1 ¡ x)m axfg(x) ¡ k;0g ;
P (x;x ¡ 1=N )= x (1 ¡ x)m axfk ¡ g(x);0g ;
and




T h e d i® eren ce b etw een th e ¯ rst tw o tra n sitio n p ro b a b ilities g iv es th e ex -
pected net i ncrease i n the popul ati on ofworkers from one transi ti on ti m e to
the next, conditional upon the current state x,as
F W (x)= P (x;x +1 =N ) ¡ P (x;x ¡ 1=N )= x (1 ¡ x)(g(x) ¡ k):
9N ote that this function is bounded and continuous in x. W e are interested in
the determ i ni sti c approxi m ati on ofthe above M arkov chai n when the popu-
lation size is large and thus the tim e interval betw een successive transition
tim es is short. T he associated m ean-¯eld equation
_ x = ' (x): = x (1 ¡ x)(g(x) ¡ k)
g iv es th e lim itin g d eterm in istic d y n a m ic a s N tendsto i n¯ni ty.BenaÄ ³m a n d
W ei bul l[ 4]prove that f or l arge popul ati on si ze,the determ i ni sti c dynam i c
is a good approxim ation of the unperturbed M arkov chain. In particular,
b y P ro p o sitio n 4 o f B en aÄ³m a n d W eib u ll [4 ], a s N tends to i n¯ni ty, the
asym ptoti cf requencydi stri buti on ofX N w ill a lm o st su rely p u t a ll p ro b a b ility
m ass on the set of stationary states of the determ inistic dynam ic.
Thef unc t i o n' is also the determ inistic repl icator dynam ics ofevol uti on-
ary gam e theory,since it says that the grow th rate of w orkers is equalto the
di®erence betw een their current average ¯tness and the population average.
(SeeTayl orand Jonker[ 20] . ) T heori gi nalpurposeoftherepl i catordynam i cs
w as to serve as a m odelof asexualgenetic reproduction. W e have just seen
that it m ay also be interpreted in term s of im itation behavior.
A restpoint ofthi sdynam i csi sa poi ntx such that ' (x)= 0. A restpoi nt
x is in terior if 0 <x <1.











T he follow ing result about restpoints and all other results in the text are
proved i n the Appendi x.
P roposi ti on 1 U nder the repl icator dynam ics,x =0and x =1 are al ways
restpo in ts. In a dd itio n ,
1. i fm =1 ,t hen x =1 ¡ k 1=(n ¡1) is a restpoin t,
2. i fm = n ,t he n k 1=(n ¡1) is a restpo in t,
103. i f1 <m<nand k = k ma x,t he n x =( m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1) is a restpo in t,
and
4. i f 1 <m<nand k< k ma x, then there are two interior restpoints,
on e strictly less than (m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1), the other strictly greater than
(m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1).
There are no other restpoints.
T he interior restpoints correspond to the sym m etric m ixed strategy equi-
libria identi¯ed by P alfrey and R osenthal[13],w ho studied the static version
ofthi s m odel .
Ar e s t p o i n t i s asym ptoticall y stabl e| henceforth,stable| i f,l oosel y speak-
ing, a sm all perturbation causes the system eventually to return to the rest-
point. In the present context a restpoint is stable if the derivative of ' (x)
w ith respect to x i s negati ve at the restpoi nt. W e can show the f ol l owi ng
a b o u t th e sta b ility o f restp o in ts.
P roposi ti on 2 U nder the repl icator dynam i cs,
1. i f m =1 ,t h e n x =0 and x =1 a r eu n s t a b l er e s t p o i n t s ,a n dx =
1 ¡ k 1=(n ¡1) is a stable restpoin t,
2. i fm = n ,t he n x =0 and x =1 a r es t a b l er e s t p o i n t s ,a n dx = k 1=(n ¡1)
is an unstable restpoint, and
3. i f 1 <m<n ,t h e n x =0 is a stabl e restpoint, x =1 is a n u n stable
restpoint, and furtherm ore
(a) if k = k ma x,t h e n x =( m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1) i s an unstabl e restpoi nt,
and
(b) if k< k ma x, the lesser of the tw o in terior restpoin ts is u n stable
and the greater is stable.
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Fi gure 1: n =5 ;m =1 ;k = :25.
Wen o t ei np a r t i c u l a rt h a ta sl o n ga sweh a v em>1 ,t h e r ei sa l wa y sa
stable restpoint w ith no w orkers. W hen there is also a stable restpoint w ith a
positive m easure ofw orkers,as is the case except w hen m<n and k ¸ k ma x,
w e need to consider perturbations of the system in order to m ake sharper
p red ictio n s a b o u t th e u ltim a te o u tco m e.
4E x a m p l e s
In this section w e discuss som e exam ples that illustrate all the possible dy-
n a mi cb e h a v i o r so ft h ed e t e r mi n i s t i cmo d e l .
Throughout,we shal lset n = 5. In the phase di agram ofFi gure 1,we
havem =1 a n d k = :25. T here is therefore a unique stable interior restpoint
at x ¼ :29.
N ote that this restpoint is ine± cient. In general,the expected num ber of
workersi n a ¯rm when thepopul ati on sharei sx is eq u a l to nx. H ence in the
present case i t i s approxi m atel y 1:45. It woul d be e± ci ent to have exactl y
one participant w orking, but w e have assum ed that such a contract is not
121
x
0 ' (x) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fi gure 2: n =5 ;m =5 ;k = :25.
possible.
F igure 2 show s the situation w hen all participants in the ¯rm have to
be w orkers in order for the ¯rm to be successful, still w ith k = :25. In thi s
case,there is an unstable interior restpoint at x ¼ :71. Starting points below
:71 therefore ul ti m atel y converge to x = 0, starting points above to x =1 .
T he unstable interior restpoint m easure of w orkers is thus the criticalm ass
necessary for convergence to a population w here everyone is a w orker. W e
note that the latter situation is the unique e± cient one.
T he dynam i calsystem i n Fi gure 3 has an unstabl e restpoi nt at x ¼ :08
and a stabl e one at:5. In this case,the low er interior restpoint functions as a
critical m ass for convergence to the higher one. For future reference, denote
the lesser interior restpoint w hen there are tw o interior restpoints by x L ,and
the greater interior restpoint by x H . A gai n,the stabl e i nteri or restpoi nt x H
is ine± cient,since the expected num ber ofw orkers in a ¯rm is here 2:5 > 2.
Fi gure 4 show s an exam pl e w here we sti l lhave m =2 , b u t n o ww e h a v e
k = :5 >k ma x ¼ :42. H ence there are no interior restpoints, and the only
stable state is x =0 .
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Fi gure 3: n =5 ;m =2 ;k = :25.
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Fi gur e4:n =5 ;m =2 ;k = :5.
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Fi gure 5: n =5 ;m =3 ;k = :15.
If w e have n odd and m =( n +1 ) =2,' is sym m etric around a m axim um
at :5. Since w ith this param eter relationship a ¯rm is successful if m ore
than hal fofi tsm em bersare workers,we m i ghtcal lsuch technol ogi essim ple-
ma j o r i t ytech n o lo g ies. F ig u re 5 sh ow s a n ex a m p le w ith n =5 , m =3 , a n d
k = :15.
Wh e n w e h a v e k< k ma x,si m pl e-m ajori ty technol ogi esal l ow foranal yti cal



































In the exam ple, w e have x L ¼ :20 and x H ¼ :80.
155 Long-R un D ynam i cs
B i ol ogi calevol uti on i s subject to m utati ons,and i n the context ofcul tural
ev o lu tio n b y m ea n s o f im ita tio n o f su ccessfu l b eh av io r it m a k es sen se to
assum e that i ndi vi dual s m ay m ake m i stakes i n sel ecti ng thei r acti ons. Par-
ti cul arl y when studyi ng the behavi orofan evol uti onary system i n the very
long run it seem s reasonable to take into account that there m ay be persis-
tentrandom shocks. (See,e. g. ,Young and Foster[ 23] ,K andori ,M al ai th and
R o b [8 ], Y o u n g [2 1 ], o r Y o u n g [2 2 ].) T h is a lso tu rn s o u t to a llow u s m a k e
m ore precise predictions about situations w here the determ inistic replicator
dynam i cshasm ul ti pl e stabl e restpoi nts.
H ence w e now introduce perturbations to the M arkov chain de¯ned above.
Speci¯cally, w e assum e that w ith probability " 2 (0;1), the agent draw n to
revise his strategy picks a strategy at random ,irrespective ofthe payo® to the
current strategy. T his de¯nes a perturbed Ma r k o vc h a i nX N; "w ith transition
probabi l i ti es
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T he perturbations m ake the M arkov chain both irred u cible and aperiodic.3
Mo r e o v e r , a s" ten d s to zero , its tra n sitio n p ro b a b ilities co n v erg e to th o se o f
the unperturbed M arkov chain. For X N; "the expected net increase in the
3A Markov chain is irreducible if there is a positive probability of moving from any
state to any other state of the state space in a ¯nite number of periods. Let N z be the
set of all integers s ¸ 1 such that there is a positive probability of moving from the state
z to z in exactly s periods. A Markov chain is aperiodic if, for every state z,t h eg r e a t e s t
common divisor of N z is unity.
16popul ati on ofworkers,f rom onetransi ti on ti m eto thenext,condi ti onalupon
the current state x becom es
F
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Thef a c tt ha tX N; " i s i rreduci bl e and aperi odi c i m pl i es the exi stence ofa
uni que i nvari ant probabi l i ty m easure º N; "such that for any B orel set B µ
[0 ;1] ,N 2 N,and " 2 (0;1);
º









whe r eV N; "(B; T) denotes the relative frequency w ith w hich B is v isited b y
X N; " during the ¯rst T p erio d s. B y co m p u tin g th e lim it o f º N; "(B )a s"
t e n d st oz e r oa n dN tendsto i n¯ni ty,weareabl eto cal cul atethestatesthat
a re m o st lik ely to b e o b serv ed in th e lo n g ru n fo r la rg e p o p u la tio n size a n d
sm a ll ra n d o m iza tio n p ro b a b ility. M o re p recisely, w e lo o k fo r sta tes w ith th e
f ol l owi ng property. 4





N; "(U )= 1:
W e can now show the follow ing.
P roposi ti on 3 The foll owing hol ds for the perturbed M arkov C hain X N; " .
1. Ifm =1 ,t he n x =1 ¡ k 1=(n ¡1) is selected .
2. Ifm = n ,t he n x =1 is selected for k< 1=2n ¡1,andx =0 is selected
fo r k> 1=2n ¡1.
4It can be shown that Proposition 3 below holds also if the order of limits is reversed
in the de¯nition of selection, i.e., if a state x is selected when, for any neighborhood U of
x ,l i m N !1 lim"! 0 º N; "(U )=1 .
173. (a) If1 <n<mand k ¸ k ma x,t hen x =0 is selected .
(b) If 1 <n<mand k< k ma x,t he n x = x H is selected if x H > 2x L ,
and x =0 if x H < 2x L .
C onsider, in particular, the case w hen there are tw o interior restpoints.
Thebasin of attraction ofthe restpoi ntx H u n d er th e d eterm in istic rep lica to r
dynam i cs,i . e. ,the setofstarti ng- poi ntssuch thatthe traj ectory eventual l y
converges to x H , is the interval (x L ;1). Let (x L ;xH )a nd( x H ;1) be the le ft
and right sub-basins ofx H ,respectively.
W e see that l ong-run sel ecti on ofthe hi gh-e®ort equi l i bri um happens i f
the l ength ofthe l ef t sub- basi n ofx H i s greater than the l ength of(0;xL ),
the basin of attraction of x L . H ence it could happen that x H has a l arger
basin of attraction than x L but is nevertheless not selected in the long run.
In the specialcase of the sim ple-m ajority technologies de¯ned earlier,w e









M ore generally, w e can prove som e lim ited com parative statics results
relating the cost k to l ong- run equi l i bri um sel ecti on.
P roposi ti on 4 If 1 <m<n , x H =xL is strictly decreasing in k fo r k 2
(0;kma x). M oreover, there exists a k ? 2 (0;kma x) such that for k 2 (0;k?),
x H =xL > 2,f ork = k ?, x H =xL =2 ,and f ork 2 (k ?;kma x);xH =xL < 2.
P roposi ti on 5 Let ^ m; ^ n ,ands be positive integers. Ifk 2 (0;kma x);m ¡ 1=
(^ m ¡ 1)s, n ¡ 1= ( ^ n ¡ 1)s,and1 < ^ m<^ n ,then there exists an ^ s such that
for 1 · s · ^ s;xH =xL is d ecrea sin g in s;and for s> ^ s,there are no i nteri or
stationary states.
Consi der the e®ects ofscal i ng the gam e up or down by m ul ti pl yi ng the
¯rm 's size and the threshold num ber of w orkers by som e constant. P ropo-






x ! x H
x ! 0
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F igure 6: E xam ple selection boundary in cost-scale space.
eq u ilib riu m x H is m o re lik ely fo r low co st a n d low sca le, a n d th e eq u ilib riu m
w ith no w orkers for high cost and high scale.
Fi gure 6 show s an exam pl e w i th m ¡ 1= s, n ¡ 1= 2 s, x L =1 =3,and
x H =2 =3. E ach point on the curve corresponds to a com bination of k and
s such that x H =xL = 2 . T h e eq u ilib riu m x H i ssel ected f orcom bi nati onsto
the southw est of the graph, and x = 0 f orcom bi nati onsto the northeastof
the graph.
To sum up,we have shown that f or a cost ofcontri buti ng l ow enough,
a n d a ¯ rm size sm a ll en o u g h , a n eq u ilib riu m w ith a su b sta n tia l freq u en cy o f
contributors is the situation m ost likely to be observed in the long run. In
the case ofsim ple-m ajority technologies,the condition can be m ade precise.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
W e know from experi m ental work that i ndi vi dual s contri bute i n di l em m a
gam eseven when contri buti ng i snotenf orceabl e.W ehaveshown i n thi spa-
p er h ow su ch b eh av io r m ay b e u n d ersto o d a s th e lo n g -ru n sta b le eq u ilib riu m
19of an evolutionary system sub ject to m utations.
W e have thought ofthe underl yi ng publ i c goods gam e as one i n whi ch
individuals expend irretrievable e®ort. T he m odel can easily be extended
to a setti ng where contri buti ons are i nstead m onetary and f ul l y ref unded
i fthe publ i c good i s not provi ded,a case that Pal f rey and Rosenthal[ 13]
also study from a static point of view . In the evolutionary version, one can
then show that there is a unique interior restpoint w ith a larger share of
contributors than in the interior restpoints w ithout refund. M oreover, this
interior restpoint is the unique stable state of the replicator dynam ic and
thus also the unique long-run prediction of the stochastic m odel.
A di ®erent extensi on ofthe m odelwoul d be to al l ow for worker and ¯rm
heterogeneity. W orkers could di®er in term s oftheir ¯tness cost ofcontribut-
ing and ¯rm s in term s of their size and contribution threshold levels. It is
also possible to m ake the size and contribution thresholds of ¯rm s deter-
m i ned endogenousl y through evol uti on. W e l eave these questi ons for future
research.
A ppendi x
P roofofP rop osition 1. Tha tx =0 a n d x = 1 arerestpoi ntsi si m m edi ate.






m ¡1(1 ¡ x)
n ¡m = k: (1)
Forthe caseswhere m =1 a n dm = n ,(1) m ay be sol ved expl i ci tl y for the
interior restpoints. W hen w e have 1 <m<n ,the l ef thand si de of(1)i sa
si ngl e- peaked f uncti on ofx wi t hama xi mum a tx =( m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1). H ence







¶m ¡1 µn ¡ m
n ¡ 1
¶n ¡m
= k ma x;
20the equati on (1) has at l east one sol uti on. In case the rel ati on hol ds w i th
eq u a lity, th e u n iq u e so lu tio n is x =( m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1). O therw ise (1) has
exactly tw o roots,w here one is necessarily strictly less than (m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1),
the other strictly greater. 2
Pr oofofPr opos i t i on 2.Weh a v et h a t
'






m ¡1(1 ¡ x)
n ¡m ((n +1 ) x ¡ m ):
Suppose we have m =1 . T h e nw e h a v e ' 0 (0) = 1 ¡ k> 0,' 0 (1) = k> 0,
and ' 0 (1 ¡ k 1=(n ¡1))= ( n ¡ 1)(k n=(n ¡1)¡ k) < 0.
Suppose instead w e have m = n .The nweha v e' 0 (0) = ¡ k< 0,' 0 (1) =
k ¡ 1 < 0,and ' 0 (k 1=(n ¡1))= ( n ¡ 1)(k ¡ k n=(n ¡1)) > 0.
Fi nal l y,suppose we have 1 <m<n .The nweha v e' 0 (0) = ¡ k< 0a n d







? (1 ¡ x ?)
n ¡m = k:
Substituting, w e ¯nd that
'




N ote that if w e have x ? =( m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1),then x ? i s a saddl e poi nt that
attracts in one direction and repels in the other,and is therefore categorized
as unstabl e. 2
T he idea behind the proof of P roposition 3 is to calculate the lim it of the
uni quei nvari antprobabi l i ty m easure º N; "as N tendsto i n¯ni ty and " tends
to 0. W hen the determ inistic dynam ic has a uni que stationary state,w e rely
upon the f ol l owi ng l em m a,whi ch hol dsf orany " 2 [0 ;1); to determ ine this
lim it.
21Lem m a 1 For any open set U ½ [0 ;1]contai ning allthe stationary states









Pr oo f .T h is fo llow s d irectly fro m P ro p o sitio n 4 o f B en aÄ³m a n d W eib u ll [4 ]
by observing that the determ inistic dynam ic has no periodic orbits. 2
W hen there is m ore than one stationary state,w e proceed by estim ating
a n d co m p a rin g th e m in im u m p ro b a b ility o f rea ch in g a n d th e m a x im u m p ro b -
a b ility o f leav in g th e b a sin s o f a ttraction ofevery asym ptotically stable state.









denote its basin of attraction. B y P roposition 8 in B enaÄ ³m








,t hecost of the transition from fx 0g to





"(y;y +1 =N ) ¡ lo g P
"(y;y ¡ 1=N ))dy:
Usi ng thi sconceptwecan de¯netheradius ofx 0;R (fx 0g);as the low est cost
ofgoi ng from fx 0g to any state outside its basin of attraction, i.e., as















Li kewi s e,t heco-radius ofx 0 c a nb ed e ¯ n e da st h eh i g h e s tc o s tt og ot ot h e
basin of attraction of x 0 from anyw here outside its basin of attraction, i.e.,
as



















Lem m a 2 Letx be an asym ptoticall y stabl e state of the determ ini stic dy-
nam i c and suppose U ½ [1 ;0] i s an open nei ghborhood of x.I f R( fxg) >











N; "(T ) 2 U
´
=1 :
22Pr oo f .T h is fo llow s im m ed ia tely fro m P ro p o sitio n 6 in B en aÄ³m a n d W eib u ll [4 ].
2
The f ol l owi ng l em m ata are usef ulf or the cal cul ati on ofthe radi us and
co-radius.
Lem m a 3 Let x "
0 and x "
P be tw o arbitrary states such that x "
0 ! x 0 and
x "












lo g P "(y;y +1 =N ) ¡ lo g P "(y;y ¡ 1=N )
lo g "
dy:
Pr oo f .A ssum e w ithout loss of generality that x "
0 · x "




and de¯ne the indicator function Ix "
0;x "
P that takes on the value 1 for x 2
[x "
0;x"

























lo g ((1 ¡ y)"=2)dy<
Z
I0;1 (1 ¡ lo g (1 ¡ y))dy =2 :












"! 0 Ix "
0;x "
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lo g P "(y;y +1 =N )
lo g "
dy













lo g P "(y;y ¡ 1=N )
lo g "
dy;
w hich proves the statem ent. 2
Lem m a 4 Let(x "
0) be a sequ en ce of asym ptotically stable states such that
lim "! 0 x "
0 = x 0; and l et (x "
P ) be a sequen ce of states su ch that x "
P is in th e
23cl osure ofthe basin ofattraction ofx "
0 for every " 2 (0;1) and lim "! 0 x "
P =






¡ lo g "
= x P ¡ x 0:



















log ((1 ¡ ")y (1 ¡ y)m axfg(y) ¡ k;0g +( 1 ¡ y)"=2)dy:
D e¯nethei ndi catorf uncti on IP + =0that takes on the value 1 for x such that
P (x;x +1 =N )= 0 and 0 for al lother x.Usi ng thi sf uncti on and Lem m a 3,




"! 0 IP + =0









1 ¡ IP + =0






IP + =0dy +0 =x P ¡ x 0:
S im ila rly, b y d e¯ n in g th e in d ica to r fu n ctio n IP ¡ =0that takes on the value 1


































1 ¡ IP ¡ =0





24P roof of P rop osition 3. C ase 1: m =1 . Forposi ti ve",t hef unct i on F "
W
hasa uni que rooton the uni ti nterval ;x "
M : As" tends to zero,x "
M tends to
x M =1 ¡ k 1=(n ¡1) and hence,the statem ent follow s directly by Lem m a 1.
Ca s e2 :m = n . For su± ciently sm all",thef uncti on F "
W hasthreerootson
the unit interval;x "
0;x"
P ;and x "
1;butonl y x "
0 and x "
1 are asym ptotically stable
states. A s " tendsto zero,the three pointsconverge to 0;xP = k 1=(n ¡1);and 1
respectively:Iti scl earthattheradi usofx "
0 is eq u a l to c (fx "
0g;fx "
P g) and the
co-radius c (fx "
1g;fx "
P g). Sim ilarly,the radius of x "
1 is eq u a l to c (fx "
1g;fx "
P g)
and the co-radi us c (fx "
0g;fx "
P g). B y L em m a 2, in the lim it, as " tends to










x 1 ¡ x P
x P ¡ x 0
= k
1=(1¡n ) ¡ 1:
T h is im p lies th a t if k< 21¡n , there exists an ^ ",such that for al l" 2 (0;^ "),
CR( f1g) < R( f1g)a n di fk> 21¡n , there exists an · ", such that for al l
" 2 (0;· "), C R (f0g) < R( f0g).
Ca s e3 :1 <n<mand k< k ma x. For su± ciently sm all ",t hef unc t i on
F "
W has three roots on the uni t i nterval ;x "
0;x"
L ; and x "
H : T he ¯rst and the
l ast ofthese poi nts are asym ptoti cal l y stabl e: As" tends to zero, the three
points converge to 0;xL ; and x H respectively: It is clear that the radius of
x "
0 is eq u a l to c (fx "
0g;fx "
L g) and the co-radius c (fx "
H g;fx "
L g). Sim ilarly, the
radius of x "
H is eq u a l to c (fx "
H g;fx "
L g) and the co-radius c (fx "
0g;fx "
L g). B y













T h is im p lies th a t if x H =xL > 2,there exi sts an ^ ",such thatf oral l" 2 (0;^ "),
CR( fx H g) < R( fx H g),and if x H =xL < 2,there exi stsan · ",such thatf oral l
" 2 (0;· "), C R (f0g) < R( f0g).
Ca s e4 :1 <m<nand k ¸ k ma x. If x ? =( m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1) < 1=2a n d
k = k ma x;for su± ciently sm all",thef uncti on F "
W hasthreerootson theuni t
interval; x "
0;x"
L ; and x "
H (if (m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1) = 1=2, the tw o latter coincide
25wi t h x ?): O f these, x "
0 and x "
H are asym ptotically stable states: As" tends
to zero, x "
0 converges to 0; and x "
L and x "
H both converge to x ?: Thi sc a s ei s












¡ 1= 0 ;
CR( f0g) < R( f0g) for su± ciently sm all ".
If x ? =( m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1)> 1=2a n dk = k ma x,ori fk> k ma x,f orsu± ci entl y
sm all",thef uncti on F "
W hasonerooton theuni ti nterval ;x "
0:Si ncethi spoi nt
c o n v e r g e st o0a s" tends to zero,the statem ent follow s directly by L em m a 1.
2
Pr oofofPr opos i t i on 4.F irst, w e shall prove that @ (x H =xL )=@k < 0f o r
al lk 2 (0;kma x). For x 2f x L ;xH g, g(x) ¡ k =0 a n d














¡ @ (g(x) ¡ k)=@k










T he l ast expressi on i s negati ve for x>(m ¡ 1)(n ¡ 1) and posi ti ve for
x< (m ¡ 1)(n ¡ 1). Si nce x L < (m ¡ 1)(n ¡ 1) <x H , it fo llow s th a t
@xL =@k > 0a n d@xH =@k < 0,and thus,
@ (x H =xL )
@k
=




T h is im p lies th a t x H =xL i s a conti nuous and stri ctl y decreasi ng f uncti on of
k on (0;kma x).
Secondl y,we shal lprove that there exi sts a ^ k such that x H > 2x L .L e t















26C learly,^ k 2 (0;kma x)andf oral lx 2 [(®=2)(m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1);®(m ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1)] ,
weha vet hat
g(x) > ^ k:














Si nce l i m k! k ma xx H =xL =1 < 2, the continuity and strict m onotonicity
ofx H =xL on (0;kma x) im ply that there exists a k ? such that for k 2 (0;k?),
x H =xL > 2,for k = k ?;xH =xL =2 ; and for k 2 (k ?;kma x);xH =xL < 2. 2








a (1 ¡ x)
b¡a :
Suppose that,f orx 2f x L ;xH g and s ¸ 1;
g (x;s(m ¡ 1);s(n ¡ 1))= k s:
The nt he r ee xi s t sak s+1> 0s u c ht h a t , f o rx 2f x L ;xH g ;
g (x;(s +1 ) ( m ¡ 1);(s +1 ) ( n ¡ 1))= k s+1:




g (x;(s +1 ) ( m ¡ 1);(s +1 ) ( n ¡ 1))
g (x;s(m ¡ 1);s(n ¡ 1))
·
g ((m ¡ 1)= (n ¡ 1);(s +1 ) ( m ¡ 1);(s +1 ) ( n ¡ 1))
g ((m ¡ 1)= (n ¡ 1);s(m ¡ 1);s(n ¡ 1))
< 1;
w h ere th e la st in eq u a lity fo llow s fro m a sta n d a rd p ro p erty o f th e b in o m ia l
distribution. Since, by P roposition 4, @ (x H =xL )=@k < 0 , th is im p lies th a t
x H =xL is strictly decreasing in s for s such that
g ((m ¡ 1)= (n ¡ 1);(s +1 ) ( m ¡ 1);(s +1 ) ( n ¡ 1))¸ k:
27F in a lly, sin ce
lim
s!1g (x;s(m ¡ 1);s(n ¡ 1))= 0
for an y x 2 [0 ;1 ] ,i tf o l l o wst ha tt he r ee xi s t sa n ^ s> 1s u c ht h a tf o rs> ^ s,
g ((m ¡ 1)= (n ¡ 1);s(m ¡ 1);s(n ¡ 1))<k :
H ence,for such s there are no interior stationary states. 2
Re f e r e n c e s
[ 1] A rm en A A l chi an and H arol d D em setz. Producti on,i nform ati on costs,
and econom i c organi zati on. A m eri can Econom ic Review, 62: 777{795,
1972.
[ 2] Jose Apestegui a,Ste®en Huck,and JÄ org O echssler. Im itation: T heory
and experi m entalevi dence. W orki ng paper,2003.
[3 ] M ich el B en aÄ³m a n d J Ä o rg en W W eib u ll. D eterm in istic a p p rox im a tio n
ofstochasti c evol uti on i n gam es. W orki ng paper,Stockhol m Schoolof
Econom i cs,2001.
[4 ] M ich el B en aÄ³m a n d J Ä o rg en W W eib u ll. D eterm in istic a p p rox im a tio n o f
stochasti c evol uti on i n gam es. Ec onome t r i c a,71: 873{903,2003.
[ 5] Theodore C Bergstrom . Evol uti on ofsoci albehavi or: Indi vi dualand
group selection. Journalof E conom ic P erspectives,16: 67{88,2002.
[6] R achel T A C roson and M elanie B eth M arks. Step returns in thresh-
o ld p u b lic g o o d s: A m eta - a n d ex p erim en ta l a n a ly sis. E xperim ental
Ec onomi c s ,2: 239{59,2000.
[7 ] B en g t H o lm strÄ om . M oralhazard i n team s. Be l lJour nalofEc onomi c s ,
13: 324{340,1982.
28[ 8] M i chi hi ro K andori ,G eorge J M ai l ath,and Raf aelRob. Learni ng,m u-
tation, and long run equilibria in gam es. Econom etri ca,61: 29{56,1993.
[ 9] Chri stoph K uzm i cs. Indi vi dual and group sel ecti on i n sym m etri c 2-
pl ayer gam es. W orki ng paper,N orthwestern U ni versi ty,2003.
[1 0 ] B ib b L a ta n ¶ e, K ip lin g W illia m s, a n d S tep h en H a rk in s. M a n y h a n d s m a k e
l i ghtthe work: The causesand consequencesofsoci all oa¯ng. Journal
ofPersonal ity & SocialPsychol ogy,37: 822{832,1979.
[ 11] Susanne Lohm ann,JÄ org O echssler,and K arlW Ä arneryd.Evol uti on and
th e so cia l d ilem m a . W o rk in g p a p er, S to ck h o lm S ch o o l o f E co n o m ics,
2001.
[1 2 ] G eo rg e J M a ila th . D o p eo p le p lay N a sh eq u ilib riu m ? L esso n s fro m
evolutionary gam e theory. Journalof Econom i c Li t erat ure, 36: 1347{
1374,1998.
[ 13] T hom as R Pal frey and H oward R osenthal . Parti ci pati on and the pro-
vision of discrete public goods: A strategic analysis. JournalofPubl i c
Ec onomi c s ,24: 171{193,1984.
[ 14] T hom as R Pal frey and H oward R osenthal . Pri vate i ncenti ves i n soci al
di l em m as:The e®ectsofi ncom pl ete i nf orm ati on and al trui sm .Journal
ofPub l i cEc onomi c s ,35: 309{332,1988.
[ 15] Arthur J Robson. Evol uti on and hum an nature. JournalofEconom i c
P erspectives,16: 89{106,2002.
[1 6 ] K a rl H S ch la g . W h y im ita te, a n d if so , h ow ? A b o u n d ed ly ra tio n a l
a p p ro a ch to m u lti-a rm ed b a n d its. JournalofEconom i c Theory,78: 130{
56,1998.
[1 7 ] K a rl H S ch la g . W h ich o n e sh o u ld I im ita te? JournalofM athem ati cal
Ec onomi c s ,31: 493{522,1999.
29[1 8 ] T o m a s S jÄ ostrÄ om and M arti n L W ei tzm an. C om peti ti on and the evo-
lution of e± ciency. JournalofEconom i c Behavi or and Organi zat i on,
30: 25{43,1996.
[1 9 ] E llio t S o b er a n d D av id S lo a n W ilso n . Unt oOt h e r s :Th eEv o l u t i o na nd
P sychol ogy ofU nsel ¯sh B ehavior.H arvard U niversity P ress,C am bridge,
1998.
[ 20] Peter D Tayl or and Leo B Jonker. Evol uti onari l y stabl e strategi es and
gam e dynam i cs. M athem aticalB iosciences,40: 145{156,1978.
[ 21] H Peyton Young.Theevol uti on ofconventi ons.Econom etri ca,61: 57{84,
1993.
[ 22] H Peyton Young. IndividualStrategy and Soci alStructure: A n Evol u-
tion ary T heory of In stitu tion s. P rinceton U niversity P ress, P rinceton,
1998.
[ 23] H Peyton Young and D ean Foster. C ooperati on i n the short and i n the
l ong run.G am es and Econom i c Behavi or,3: 145{56,1991.
30CESifo Working Paper Series 




1257 François Larmande and Jean-Pierre Ponssard, EVA and the Controllability-congruence 
Trade-off: An Empirical Investigation, August 2004 
 
1258 Vesa Kanniainen and Jenni Pääkkönen, Anonymous Money, Moral Sentiments and 
Welfare, August 2004 
 
1259 Panu Poutvaara and Andreas Wagener, Why is the Public Sector More Labor-Intensive? 
A Distortionary Tax Argument, August 2004 
 
1260 Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt, Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals 
Regarding the Judiciary, August 2004 
 
1261 Joop Hartog, Hans van Ophem, and Simona Maria Bajdechi, How Risky is Investment 
in Human Capital?, August 2004 
 
1262 Thomas Eichner and Rüdiger Pethig, Efficient Nonanthropocentric Nature Protection, 
August 2004 
 
1263 David-Jan Jansen and Jakob de Haan, Look Who’s Talking: ECB Communication 
during the First Years of EMU, August 2004 
 
1264 David F. Bradford, The X Tax in the World Economy, August 2004 
 
1265 Hans-Werner Sinn, Migration, Social Standards and Replacement Incomes. How to 
Protect Low-income Workers in the Industrialized Countries against the Forces of 
Globalization and Market Integration, August 2004 
 
1266 Wolfgang Leininger, Fending off one Means Fending off all: Evolutionary Stability in 
Submodular Games, August 2004 
 
1267 Antoine Bommier and Bertrand Villeneuve, Risk Aversion and the Value of Risk to 
Life, September 2004 
 
1268 Harrie A. A. Verbon and Lex Meijdam, Too Many Migrants, Too Few Services: A 
Model of Decision-making on Immigration and Integration with Cultural Distance, 
September 2004 
 
1269 Thomas Eichner and Rüdiger Pethig, Economic Land Use, Ecosystem Services and 
Microfounded Species Dynamics, September 2004 
 
1270 Federico Revelli, Performance Rating and Yardstick Competition in Social Service 
Provision, September 2004 
 
1271 Gerhard O. Orosel and Klaus G. Zauner, Vertical Product Differentiation When Quality 
is Unobservable to Buyers, September 2004  
1272 Christoph Böhringer, Stefan Boeters, and Michael Feil, Taxation and Unemployment: 
An Applied General Equilibrium Approach, September 2004 
 
1273 Assaf Razin and Efraim Sadka, Welfare Migration: Is the Net Fiscal Burden a Good 
Measure of its Economics Impact on the Welfare of the Native-Born Population?, 
September 2004 
 
1274 Tomer Blumkin and Volker Grossmann, Ideological Polarization, Sticky Information, 
and Policy Reforms, September 2004 
 
1275 Katherine Baicker and Nora Gordon, The Effect of Mandated State Education Spending 
on Total Local Resources, September 2004 
 
1276 Gabriel J. Felbermayr and Wilhelm Kohler, Exploring the Intensive and Extensive 
Margins of World Trade, September 2004 
 
1277 John Burbidge, Katherine Cuff and John Leach, Capital Tax Competition with 
Heterogeneous Firms and Agglomeration Effects, September 2004 
 
1278 Joern-Steffen Pischke, Labor Market Institutions, Wages and Investment, September 
2004 
 
1279 Josef Falkinger and Volker Grossmann, Institutions and Development: The Interaction 
between Trade Regime and Political System, September 2004 
 
1280 Paolo Surico, Inflation Targeting and Nonlinear Policy Rules: The Case of Asymmetric 
Preferences, September 2004 
 
1281 Ayal Kimhi, Growth, Inequality and Labor Markets in LDCs: A Survey, September 
2004 
 
1282 Robert Dur and Amihai Glazer, Optimal Incentive Contracts for a Worker who Envies 
his Boss, September 2004 
 
1283 Klaus Abberger, Nonparametric Regression and the Detection of Turning Points in the 
Ifo Business Climate, September 2004 
 
1284 Werner Güth and Rupert Sausgruber, Tax Morale and Optimal Taxation, September 
2004 
 
1285 Luis H. R. Alvarez and Erkki Koskela, Does Risk Aversion Accelerate Optimal Forest 
Rotation under Uncertainty?, September 2004 
 
1286 Giorgio Brunello and Maria De Paola, Market Failures and the Under-Provision of 
Training, September 2004 
 
1287 Sanjeev Goyal, Marco van der Leij and José Luis Moraga-González, Economics: An 
Emerging Small World?, September 2004 
 
  
1288 Sandro Maffei, Nikolai Raabe and Heinrich W. Ursprung, Political Repression and 
Child Labor: Theory and Empirical Evidence, September 2004 
 
1289 Georg Götz and Klaus Gugler, Market Concentration and Product Variety under Spatial 
Competition: Evidence from Retail Gasoline, September 2004 
 
1290 Jonathan Temple and Ludger Wößmann, Dualism and Cross-Country Growth 
Regressions, September 2004 
 
1291 Ravi Kanbur, Jukka Pirttilä and Matti Tuomala, Non-Welfarist Optimal Taxation and 
Behavioral Public Economics, October 2004 
 
1292 Maarten C. W. Janssen, José Luis Moraga-González and Matthijs R. Wildenbeest, 
Consumer Search and Oligopolistic Pricing: An Empirical Investigation, October 2004 
 
1293 Kira Börner and Christa Hainz, The Political Economy of Corruption and the Role of 
Financial Institutions, October 2004 
 
1294 Christoph A. Schaltegger and Lars P. Feld, Do Large Cabinets Favor Large 
Governments? Evidence from Swiss Sub-Federal Jurisdictions, October 2004 
 
1295 Marc-Andreas Mündler, The Existence of Informationally Efficient Markets When 
Individuals Are Rational, October 2004 
 
1296 Hendrik Jürges, Wolfram F. Richter and Kerstin Schneider, Teacher Quality and 
Incentives: Theoretical and Empirical Effects of Standards on Teacher Quality, October 
2004 
 
1297 David S. Evans and Michael Salinger, An Empirical Analysis of Bundling and Tying: 
Over-the-Counter Pain Relief and Cold Medicines, October 2004 
 
1298 Gershon Ben-Shakhar, Gary Bornstein, Astrid Hopfensitz and Frans van Winden, 
Reciprocity and Emotions: Arousal, Self-Reports, and Expectations, October 2004 
 
1299 B. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Institutions and Technological Innovation 
During Early Economic Growth: Evidence from the Great Inventors of the United 
States, 1790 – 1930, October 2004 
 
1300 Piero Gottardi and Roberto Serrano, Market Power and Information Revelation in 
Dynamic Trading, October 2004 
 
1301 Alan V. Deardorff, Who Makes the Rules of Globalization?, October 2004 
 
1302 Sheilagh Ogilvie, The Use and Abuse of Trust: Social Capital and its Deployment by 
Early Modern Guilds, October 2004 
 
1303 Mario Jametti and Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Disaster Insurance or a Disastrous 
Insurance – Natural Disaster Insurance in France, October 2004 
 
  
1304 Pieter A. Gautier and José Luis Moraga-González, Strategic Wage Setting and 
Coordination Frictions with Multiple Applications, October 2004 
 
1305 Julia Darby, Anton Muscatelli and Graeme Roy, Fiscal Federalism, Fiscal 
Consolidations and Cuts in Central Government Grants: Evidence from an Event Study, 
October 2004 
 
1306 Michael Waldman, Antitrust Perspectives for Durable-Goods Markets, October 2004 
 
1307 Josef Honerkamp, Stefan Moog and Bernd Raffelhüschen, Earlier or Later: A General 
Equilibrium Analysis of Bringing Forward an Already Announced Tax Reform, 
October 2004 
 
1308 M. Hashem Pesaran, A Pair-Wise Approach to Testing for Output and Growth 
Convergence, October 2004 
 
1309 John Bishop and Ferran Mane, Educational Reform and Disadvantaged Students: Are 
They Better Off or Worse Off?, October 2004 
 
1310 Alfredo Schclarek, Consumption and Keynesian Fiscal Policy, October 2004 
 
1311 Wolfram F. Richter, Efficiency Effects of Tax Deductions for Work-Related Expenses, 
October 2004 
 
1312 Franco Mariuzzo, Patrick Paul Walsh and Ciara Whelan, EU Merger Control in 
Differentiated Product Industries, October 2004 
 
1313 Kurt Schmidheiny, Income Segregation and Local Progressive Taxation: Empirical 
Evidence from Switzerland, October 2004 
 
1314 David S. Evans, Andrei Hagiu and Richard Schmalensee, A Survey of the Economic 
Role of Software Platforms in Computer-Based Industries, October 2004 
 
1315 Frank Riedel and Elmar Wolfstetter, Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous 
Ascending Bid Auctions, October 2004 
 
1316 Patricia Crifo and Jean-Louis Rullière, Incentives and Anonymity Principle: Crowding 
Out Toward Users, October 2004 
 
1317 Attila Ambrus and Rossella Argenziano, Network Markets and Consumers 
Coordination, October 2004 
 
1318 Margarita Katsimi and Thomas Moutos, Monopoly, Inequality and Redistribution Via 
the Public Provision of Private Goods, October 2004 
 
1319 Jens Josephson and Karl Wärneryd, Long-Run Selection and the Work Ethic, October 
2004 